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MARRIED WOMEN ACROSS U.S. CITIES
DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
Abstract. This paper documents a little-noticed feature of U.S. labor markets|very large
variation in the labor supply of married women across cities. We focus on cross-city dif-
ferences in commuting times as a potential explanation for this variation. We start with
a model in which commuting times introduce non-convexities into the budget set. Empir-
ical evidence is consistent with the model's predictions: Labor force participation rates of
married women are negatively correlated with the metropolitan area commuting time. Also,
metropolitan areas with larger increases in average commuting time in 1980-2000 had slower
growth in the labor force participation of married women.
JEL: J21, J22, R23, R41.
Keywords: female labor supply, local labor markets, commute time, non-convex budget
sets
Introduction
Women's labor supply has, for good reason, been the object of extensive empirical study.
After all, the dramatic rise in female labor force participation that occurred over the past
60 years in the U.S. (and in many other countries) has been the most visible and important
shift in the labor market. Also, women's labor supply is often the margin of adjustment in
households' responses to policy shifts, e.g., changes in the taxation of household income or
welfare entitlement programs, and thus holds the key to proper policy evaluation.
Although many empirical studies of female labor supply have been conducted, it appears
that an interesting, potentially important feature of the U.S. markets has gone largely unno-
ticed: There is wide variation in female labor supply across metropolitan areas in the United
States. Consider, for example, one large group of women: married non-Hispanic white
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can meetings, SOLE meetings, Southern Illinois University, University of Chicago, University of Illinois at
Chicago, and University of Nebraska-Lincoln.
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women aged 25 to 55 with a high school level education (found in the 2000 U.S. Census). In
Minneapolis 79 percent of such women were employed, while in New York the proportion is
only 52 percent.
The cross-city variation in female labor supply within the U.S. that we document in this
paper is as large as the well-known and widely studied variation across OECD countries
in female employment rates. For instance, by way of rough comparison, one might look
at employment rates among women with \upper secondary education" from selected OECD
countries: United Kingdom, 80 percent; Sweden, 78 percent; Netherlands, 74 percent; France,
71 percent; Canada, 69 percent; U.S., 66 percent; Italy, 64 percent; Japan, 59 percent; and
Germany, 52 percent. (These statistics, for women aged 25 to 64, are from OECD, 2007.)
In an e®ort to make sense of international comparisons, analysts typically focus on policy
di®erences across countries (in paid parental leave, marginal taxes, employment protection,
welfare bene¯ts, etc.).
1 Such policy di®erences, of course, are much smaller across locations
in the U.S. than OECD countries. The cross-city variation in female labor supply in the
U.S. is apparently generated by characteristics of the local markets themselves.
Furthermore, while the labor supply of women has increased substantially in all cities in the
U.S. over the past 60 years, there have been big di®erences in these cities in the timing and
magnitude of the increase. Figure 1 illustrates, for 1940 through 2000, the well-known large
increases in the labor supply of married non-Hispanic white women generally, and shows also
how di®erent the paths are for two particular urban locations, New York and Minneapolis.
In 1940 the labor supply among women was lower in Minneapolis than in New York, but
the subsequent growth in female labor supply was much more rapid in Minneapolis than
in New York, leading to the large disparities observed in 2000. These results are especially
interesting in light of the ongoing discussion about the possibility that the U.S. labor market
has now achieved a \natural rate" of female labor force participation.
2
1Ruhm (1998), for example, focuses on the impact of paid parental leave policy on female labor supply
in nine European countries. More generally, a large literature compares labor policy di®erences in the U.S.,
Canada, and Europe to explain di®erences in labor market outcomes. Nickell (1997), Card et al. (1999),
Freeman and Schettkat (2001), and Alesina et al. (2005) are just a few examples.
2Many authors have documented the fact that female labor force participation slowed considerably in the
mid-1990's, and leveled o® in the 2000s, e.g., Blau et al. (2002), Blau and Kahn (2000), and Juhn and Potter
(2006). Goldin (2006) points to the importance of considering di®erent age groups separately (rather than
simply looking at aggregate measures of female labor supply), noting that for some groups of women \a
plateau ... was reached a decade and a half ago." Looking at variation across local labor markets brings an
additional dimension of complexity. Should we expect that cities with low rates of labor force participation
will continue to experience an increase in female labor supply until they reach the national average, or are
there reasons to expect that some markets have a lower \equilibrium" participation rate than others?WOMEN'S LABOR SUPPLY 3
The goals of this paper are to carefully document the cross-city variation in married
women's labor supply across U.S. labor markets, to explore potential economic explana-
tions for observed cross-city variation in married women's labor supply, and to examine the
implications for the study of female labor supply generally. We believe that many factors
are at play in producing the large observed local variation in female labor supply across
the U.S., but, we argue, one explanation stands out: Married women, particularly married
women with young children, are very sensitive to commuting times when making labor force
participation decisions.
In building our argument about the importance of commuting cost, we start with the
theory of labor supply when there is a ¯xed cost of participation (i.e., commuting time).
The introduction of a ¯xed cost of participation introduces non-convexities into the budget
constraint. This complication is easily handled in a one-period case for a one-person house-
hold: Assuming leisure and consumption are normal, and assuming also that initially the
individual is at an \interior solution," an increase in the ¯xed cost reduces both leisure and
labor supplied, up to a threshold at which the individual moves to a \corner solution" of
supplying zero labor. Matters are more interesting in a model in which a two-person house-
hold takes a \collective" approach to labor supply. In this case, increases in the commute
time can induce one partner (traditionally the wife) to move out of the labor force while
inducing the other partner (the husband) to work longer hours.
As mentioned above, there are many studies of women's labor supply. Blundell et al.
(2007) and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) provide valuable discussions of key issues in this
literature, and Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) overview earlier results. Most studies use
national data, with results aggregated at the national level, and no attention is given to the
possibility of meaningful local variation. A small body of work in economic geography does
provide some evidence about cross-location variation in labor supply (e.g., Odland and Ellis
(1998) and Ward and Dale (1992)), but this work does not seek to provide an explanation
for the observed variation. In particular, we know of no work that posits the importance
of ¯xed commuting costs for explaining local labor supply and then evaluates predictions
empirically. We carry out such an analysis in ¯ve additional sections:
Section 1 provides the basic facts about the city-speci¯c employment rates of non-Hispanic
white married women in 50 large U.S. metropolitan areas from 1940 through 2000 using
Public Use Samples of the U.S. Census. We document signi¯cant variation across cities in4 DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
current levels of women's employment, and also substantial variation across cities in the
magnitude and timing of the increase in female labor supplied over the past 60 years.
Section 2 is a discussion of economic forces that might serve as potential explanations for
the observed cross-cities variation in women's labor supply. We argue that the variation in
observed employment rates are unlikely to be due primarily to di®erences across cities in
labor demand.
Section 3 contains the primary economic contribution of this study. We develop an argu-
ment about the e®ect of cross-city di®erences in commuting times (owing, for example, to
di®erences in congestion across cities) for labor force participation. Our model allows us to
examine the e®ect of commuting time on individuals' and households' labor supply.
Section 4 presents empirical evidence concerning the predictions of the model. The cross-
sectional evidence indicates that in cities with longer average commuting times, female labor
force participation rates are lower. Women with young children are particularly sensitive to
longer commute. We try a simple IV strategy (using location of birth as an instrument) in an
e®ort to deal with potential endogeneity of location, and ¯nd that this does not change our
key empirical ¯ndings. Also, results are similar for a speci¯cation that looks at di®erences
over time (from 1980 to 1990 and 1990 to 2000). These results are all consistent with the
theory presented in Section 3.
Finally, Section 5 provides a conclusion and discussion of directions for future research.
1. Differences in Labor Supply Across Labor Markets
This study focuses on the labor supply of married non-Hispanic white women who live in
the 50 largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) in the United States. The focus on
married women is motivated by the fact that these women are most responsible for the large
changes in female labor supply that have been observed over the past several decades (see,
e.g., Juhn and Potter (2006)). Women in racial and ethnic minorities are excluded to avoid
the complications of dealing with additional dimensions to the analysis, and because sample
sizes for these groups are much smaller. The sample is restricted to individuals aged 25 to
55.WOMEN'S LABOR SUPPLY 5
For much of our analysis we rely on the 2000 Census 5 percent Public Use Micro Sample
(PUMS).
3 We also exploit comparable data from 1940 through 1990 (except 1960, owing to
the lack of MSA identi¯ers for that year).
4
The PUMS data provide information on employment status. The three main categories
are employed, unemployed, and not in the labor force. For the most part, the analysis below
looks at the \employment rate" as the measure of labor force participation in a local labor
market, thereby including women who are reported as unemployed with those who are out
of labor force.
5 Included in the sample are women in the armed forces; they constitute 0:1
percent of the sample in 2000.
We begin by estimating participation rates for each of the 50 MSAs, for selected years,
1940 through 2000. Results are given for women in the largest educational category|women
with a high school diploma. The results are sorted by participation rates in 2000, from lowest
to highest. The variation evident in the statistics is striking. In 2000 the participation rates
of high school educated women vary from just 52 percent in New York City to 79 percent
in Minneapolis. Similarly wide variation is evident in other years as well; for instance,
in 1970 MSA-speci¯c participation rates varied from 30 percent to 59 percent. There are
also substantial di®erences in the growth of married women's labor supply over time. For
example, from 1940 through 2000, the participation rate increased by 36 percentage points
in New York but by 64 percentage points in Minneapolis (as we have seen in Figure 1).
We examined the extent to which cross-city di®erences in the age distribution of women
account for the observed labor force participation rates and found that this matters very
little.6 We also constructed tables similar to Table 1 separately for women without children,
women with older children, and women with young children. The summary is reported in
Table 2. In each case, we found big di®erences across cities in labor force participation.
3Individuals with imputed values are excluded from the analysis. The resulting sample is quite large,
423,300 observations.
4For details of the data see Ruggles et al. (2010).
5The PUMS de¯nes unemployed persons as those without a job and looking for a job. It is di±cult to
know the extent to which a married woman might indicate that she is looking for a job if she intends to return
to work at some point, but is not actively currently seeking a job. In any event, none of the conclusions
below are altered if unemployed women are instead included in the labor force. (Unemployed women are
only 1.5 percent of the sample; the average unemployment rate is only 2 percent.)
6In particular, we try \standardizing" using the national age distribution. First, the age distribution f(a)
is calculated for all the women in a sample. Then in each MSA j, for each age a the employment rate Ej(a)
is found. Finally, a standardized participation is obtained for MSA j rate: Ej =
P55
a=25 Ej(a)f(a): This
makes virtually no di®erence for Table 1.6 DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
For example, in 2000, among high school graduate women with children younger than 5,
participation rates varied from 29 percent (New York) to 68 percent (Minneapolis).
The data indicate comparably wide variation in an alternative measure of labor supply|
annual work hours, which can be computed as a product of individuals' reported \weeks
worked last year" and \usual weekly hours." For instance, in 2000 this measure of labor
supply varied from 862 hours worked per year (New York) to 1,456 hours (Minneapolis).
Similarly, we repeated the analysis for a second large educational group, women with
college degrees. Participation rates of college educated women are generally higher than
for women with high school diplomas, but we found signi¯cant cross-MSA di®erences in
labor force participation for these women as well. For example, participation rates of college
educated women with children range from 65 percent (Honolulu) to 86 percent (Albany).
2. Possible Explanations
It is likely that many factors are at play in producing the large variation across cities
in observed married women's labor force participation. However, none of the most obvious
explanations seems to be key. In particular, we focus initially on three factors that intuitively
might in°uence participation: local housing prices, local wages, and the local unemployment
rate (which might be an indicator of local demand for labor).
To set our discussion, we examine MSA-level regressions, separately for high school- and
college-educated married women, in which local labor force participation is the dependent
variable. As independent variables we have a measure of local housing costs (based on a
quality-adjusted housing price index developed by Chen and Rosenthal (2008)), local wages
(which we calculate using wages of single women, i.e., women who are not in the analyses),
and the local unemployment rate for men.
7 Results are reported in Table 3.
8
One might expect that married women are more likely to work in relatively expensive
cities, if only because their income is crucial to pay for high housing costs.
9 Our regressions
do not indicate that this is the case. Moreover, we see in the ¯rst column in Table 1 that
expensive cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and San Francisco are actually close to the
7We thank Stuart Rosenthal for providing the data.
8For all regressions, we also used the ACCRA city cost of living index as an alternative to the Chen-
Rosenthal housing price index, using the 46 MSAs for which the ACCRA index is available. Key results
were virtually unchanged. For a description of how ACCRA (American Chamber of Commerce Research
Association) cost of living index is constructed see www.coli.org.
9For instance, Fortin (1995), using data from the 1986 Canadian Family Expenditures Survey, shows that
labor supply of some married women is a®ected by mortgage commitments.WOMEN'S LABOR SUPPLY 7
top of the list as cities with low participation; there is a negative correlation between female
participation rate and our housing price index (¡0:42).10
We might also expect that women's labor decisions are in°uenced by local wages. In fact,
in our regression the local wage rate for women|as indicated by the local wage of single
women (who generally have high labor force participation)|does not appear to have a large
impact on local labor force participation.11
As we have emphasized, the cross-MSA variation is very large. Di®erences across cities are
also quite persistent across decades. For example, the correlation between the 1990 MSA-
level participation rates and 2000 MSA-level participation rates is 0.82, and comparable
correlation coe±cients are 0.82 for 1980{1990, and 0.81 for 1970{1980. These large and
persistent di®erences are likely not due to local demand shocks. Having said that, transitory
local shocks surely do matter, and in our regressions we include the local unemployment rate
for men as a way of examining this possibility.
12 As expected, married women's labor force
participation is lower when male unemployment is relatively high. It is helpful to keep this
feature of the markets in mind when conducting explorations of other potential explanations.
Yet another contributing factor to variation in local female labor supply is the cost of
child care.
13 We make no attempts here to directly evaluate cross-city di®erences in child-
care costs on the labor supply of mothers with young children. But there are good reasons to
believe that child-care costs are at best an incomplete part of the story. First, participation
rates and average hours worked vary greatly across cities even among married women with-
out children|women who presumably are little a®ected by di®erences in child-care costs.
10Johnson (2009) ¯nds that housing prices are positively correlated with female participation rate in a
larger sample of over 200 MSAs, but not for the 50 largest MSAs that we consider.
11If instead we simply look at the relationship between observed wages for married women (among women
who work) and the participation rate, we ¯nd a correlation coe±cient of ¡0:46 (signi¯cant at the 0.01 level).
That is, higher wages are associated with lower participation rates. Of course, given the selection process
of women into the labor market, interpretation is di±cult. For instance, this negative correlation would be
expected if women who work are disproportionately drawn from the high end of the talent pool.
12Women's unemployment rates are mechanically related to participation rates as de¯ned in this study,
so as an alternative we use unemployment rates constructed for men as a measure of local labor demand.
In particular, we compute unemployment rates of white men with high school diploma or above aged 25
to 55 years old in each of the 50 MSAs (using the usual de¯nition, i.e., the proportion of people in the
labor force who are unemployed). To account for di®erences in demographic distributions across cities,
the unemployment rates are standardized using the national distribution of age and education. These
standardized unemployment rates for men in the 50 MSAs vary between 1.2 percent and 4.4 percent in 2000.
13The evidence on the magnitude of labor supply elasticity with respect to child care costs is mixed and
the range of elasticity estimates is wide. (See Blau (2003) for a review of this literature.) Baker et al.
(2005) analyze the impact of Quebec's subsidized child care program on labor supply of mothers, ¯nding a
signi¯cant but relatively small impact.8 DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
Second, across the 50 cities in the study, labor supply measures for women with children
and women without children are positively correlated; the correlation is 0:80 (signi¯cant at
the 0.01 level) for women with a high school diploma. It appears that the same city-speci¯c
factors a®ect both married women with children and without children.
A study of \power couples" by Costa and Kahn (2000) potentially o®ers some clues about
cross-MSA variation in married women's labor supply. In that paper, college educated
couples are shown to be concentrated heavily in large metropolitan areas. If college educated
women disproportionately locate in large cities, the average participation rate in these cities
would be higher than in smaller cities. This argument, however, does not help explain
the large di®erences in female labor supply that exist even among large cities. Nor is the
argument helpful in understanding why labor force participation varies so widely across cities
among women with a high school level of education.
Acemoglu et al. (2004) document that in 1950 there was substantial cross-state variation
in female labor supply, stemming from military mobilization for World War II, and work by
Fern¶ andez et al. (2004) indicates that there could be hysteretic e®ects. In particular, they
¯nd that wives of men whose mothers worked are more likely to work. Thus, local history
can matter. With that in mind we note that the correlation in MSA-level di®erences in
women's labor force participation, i.e., correlations in columns of Table 1, are as follows:
2000 outcomes have a 0.86 correlation with 1990 outcomes, a 0.49 correlation with 1980
outcomes, a 0.40 correlation with 1970 outcomes, and a 0.11 correlation with 1950 outcomes.
Recent patterns are highly correlated with each other, but are not highly correlated with
patterns observed after World War II.
In this study we turn to a simple economic explanation that di®ers from initially appealing
ideas mentioned above; we look at the role of commuting costs that vary across cities.
3. A Model of Labor Supply with Commuting Time
Among the important systematic ways in which cities di®er are tra±c patterns, congestion,
and the resulting length of the commute to work. Commuting time can be viewed as a ¯xed
time cost and/or monetary cost of going to work. Oi (1976), in a classic paper, introduces
the idea that commuting time might play an important role in family labor supply decisions,
including the joint decision about where to live. Cogan (1981) presents an analysis of labor
supply with ¯xed money and time costs of labor market entry, arguing that ¯xed costs \are of
prime importance in determining the labor supply behavior of married women." The generalWOMEN'S LABOR SUPPLY 9
idea is developed in the urban economics literature, motivating a small empirical literature.
For example, Gordon et al. (1989) show that women have shorter commute times than men
regardless of income, occupation, or marital status.
Existing theoretical work does not focus on the role of ¯xed costs in joint household labor
supply, nor does it focus on the dynamic setting. As we show below, these issues may be
crucial for understanding the role of ¯xed costs in labor force participation and hours worked.
Also, we know of no research that uses cross-city variation in commuting times as a way of
learning about the potential importance of ¯xed costs in labor supply decisions.
As a starting point to motivate our empirical work, we present a simple theory of ¯xed
cost and labor supply. The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, we consider a one-person
one-period case. We then turn to a formulation in which labor is supplied by a two-person
household in a \collective model" of intrafamilial decisions along the lines of Chiappori (1988)
and Chiappori (1992). 14
3.1. A Static One-Person Model. Consider the standard labor supply model with the
addition of a commuting cost, which we assume here is a time cost. Let c > 0 denote the time
cost of commuting incurred whenever hours of work are positive. In a one-period one-person
model, we can write the budget constraint and time constraint, respectively, as
F = N + wT = pX + wL + wIc; and (1)
T ¸ L + Ic; (2)
where T is the endowment of time, N is non-labor income, p is the price of the consumption
good X, w, the wage, is the implicit price of leisure L or commuting, I is an indicator
function equal to 1 when L < T and equal to 0 when L = T, and then F is full income.
For the speci¯cation of preferences, we will assume that the agent has a twice di®erentiable,
strictly concave utility function in which both the consumption good and the leisure are
normal. (The assumption of strict concavity provides the agent with an incentive to smooth
her consumption over time when we move to a multiple-period model.) In such a world, the
objective of the agent is to maximize utility, u(X;L), subject to the constraint that leisure
may never be larger than the time endowment and the budget constraint, which, from (1)
14An alternative interpretation, which might be of independent interest concerns the impact of commuting
time on lifetime labor supply in a dynamic setting with 2 periods (which generalizes easily to n periods).10 DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
and (2), can be written
(3) N + w(T ¡ L ¡ Ic) = pX:
From a technical standpoint, the only di±culty is that the indicator function I makes the
budget constraint nonconvex.
To solve this problem, for any prices and nonlabor income, we can simply solve the problem
under two regimes: (i) the agent pays commuting costs and is free to work or not and (ii) the
agent does not pay the commuting cost and cannot work. Each of the two regimes provides
us with a standard convex budget set, which in turn allows us to apply the theorems of
concave optimization. The agent then selects the regime that provides the higher utility.
The problem facing the agent when she does not commute (and therefore cannot work) is
simple: She merely sets consumption equal to X = N=p. In solving the problem when the
agent does commute, necessary conditions are
uL(X;L) ¸ ¸w; (4)
uX(X;L) = ¸p; and (5)
N + w(T ¡ L ¡ Ic) = pX: (6)
As we have said, the agent solves each of these problems and chooses the outcome that yields
higher utility.
We depict the indirect utility function that results from each of the two optimizations
problems in Figure 2, which shows the relationship between the indirect utility functions
and full income F. Because leisure is a normal good, we know that the no commute/no
work indirect utility, Vnc; must cut the commute/work indirect utility, Vc from below. Let
F ¤ depict full income such that the agent is indi®erent between working and not.15 To the
right of F ¤, the agent chooses not to work, and to the left of F ¤ the agent works. To develop
some intuition for the agent's choices, consider behavior at F = F ¤. If the agent works, she
consumes more but pays both the cost of commuting and the cost of foregone leisure due to
work. If she chooses not to work, she accrues additional leisure and does not need to pay
the commuting costs, but she must reduce her consumption.
Comparative statics are easy in this set up. Consider, for example, an increase in commut-
ing costs c. The impact on the indirect functions is depicted in Figure 3, which shows the
15We are looking for a non-trivial solution, so we do not consider a case when Vnc > Vc for all positive
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comparative statics for an increase in commuting cost to c0 > c. If the agent is initially not
commuting (i.e., if her income initially exceeds F ¤), the increase, of course, has no impact
on her utility. If she initially is working, the utility of working must decline. The critical
value of full income is now smaller. An increase in commuting cost, of course, never induces
a non-working agent to join the labor force, but it can induce her to withdraw from the labor
force.
We have one ¯nal observation in the static model. Conditional on staying employed,
individuals facing an increased commuting cost will work fewer hours. Figure 4 illustrates
the logic: When commuting cost is c0, the choice is (L¤(c0);X¤(c0)). After an increase in c,
the new budget constraint is BC1. Since leisure and consumption are both normal, the new
optimal point must lie on a segment of BC1 between points y and z. Thus the decrease in
leisure L is less than x ¡ y = ¢c. Since the decrease in leisure is less than the increase in
commuting time, work hours decline.
3.2. Labor Supply with a Two-Person Problem. The one-person model provides in-
sight, but it misses a key feature of an intertemporal or two-person problem. When working
more than one period, an agent can move ¯nancial resources between periods to smooth
consumption. The same is true of Chiappori's collective household model; as Chiappori
(1992) shows (see Proposition 1), the collective approach can formally be modeled as a case
in which each person maximizes own utility subject to a transfer between individuals (en-
dogenously determined). Here we set up a case with two people, which is formally the same
as an individual maximizing over two periods. To simplify notation, we suppose that both
individuals in the household face the same wage.
With two individuals, total income becomes
2 X
i=1
(wT + Ni) = F1 + F2:
where Fi is full income for individual i. The non-convex budget set is now
(7) F1 + F2 =
2 X
i=1
(wT + Ni) =
2 X
i=1
(pXi + wLi + wIic);
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which assumes a symmetric collective model of household maximization. 16
Our approach to the utility maximization problem is to exploit separability of the utility
function and make this a \two-stage budgeting problem." Let yi be a (possibly negative)
transfer from one person to another in the household.17 In the ¯rst stage, conditional on
the price, the wage, and a given allocation of income, the household chooses the optimal
consumption bundle in the same manner as in a one-person problem. Let Vc(Fi;w;p) denote
the indirect utility function if the commuting cost is incurred and Vnc(Fi;p) denote the








The function V ¤(F;w;p) is continuous in its variables, but, of course, is not di®erentiable at
the crossing point.



















The utility function is continuous in Fi and the budget set is convex so the function has an
optimum. There may not be a unique optimum because the household may be indi®erent
between having the husband work full time and the wife stay at home or the wife work full
time and the husband stay at home. We follow a convention of assuming the wife is the one
staying at home if one person does not work.
While the explicit derivation of the optimal conditions is tedious, armed with our insights
from the static model this is a simple problem to solve. If a household's nonlabor income
is su±ciently high, neither individual in the household will work. Conversely, if nonlabor
income is su±ciently low, both may choose to work. In each of these cases, the analysis
parallels the static case.
16A generalization would place di®ering weights on u, but this does not alter any of the analysis that
follows, and complicates notation.
17Of course, y1 = ¡y2.WOMEN'S LABOR SUPPLY 13
More interesting, however, is the case where the household ¯nds it optimal to have one
person work but not the other. To see why, consider Figure 5. In Figure 5 we see that the two
indirect functions create a nonconcave objective function, and this in turn has an important
impact on participation. Consider a household with full income F ¤ for each individual,
such that Vc(F ¤;w;p) = Vnc(F ¤;p). If these individuals were on their own, each would be
indi®erent between working or not working. However, given full income 2F ¤ in the two-
person model, one person would work while the other would not. The ability of individuals
within the household to reallocate resources between themselves essentially \convexi¯es"
the budget set. Note that our argument holds for households with full income that di®er
modestly from 2F ¤; a household with joint full income su±ciently close to 2F ¤ will optimally
have one person work while the other one does not.
Comparative statics in the two-person model are not particularly di±cult. As in the static
model, an increase in c can induce individuals to withdraw from the labor market, e.g., in
this case it could cause households with two earners to become a household with one earner.
In contrast to the one-person model, in the two-person model an increase in the commuting
cost can result in the husband supplying more hours in a period in which he works. To see
how this occurs, consider Figure 6. In Figure 6, the household initially has just enough full
income F ¤ to be indi®erent between both individuals working or one individual working.18
Now if there is a small increase in the commute cost, the household unambiguously prefers
to have one person working. Relative to the outcome with both are working, when they
move to having one person only work, full income declines. Given that leisure is normal,
the husband will consume less leisure, i.e., work longer hours. ( Since the consumption good
is also normal, consumption of course declines as well.) As Heim and Meyer (2004) note,
the presence of nonconvexities in the budget constraint may result in the agent exhibiting
discontinuous behaviors similar to an agent with nonconvex preferences (but conventional
convex budget sets).
To summarize, in both a one-person and two-person model we have an unambiguous
prediction about the impact of commuting cost c on labor force participation: An increase
in c can never cause an increase in labor force participation, but it can cause a decrease.
For example, with a two-person household an increase in commute time can induce one
individual to withdraw from the labor market.
18They can work both periods, and each receive Vc(F¤;w;p)). Or one can work, and have full income
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In a cross section of cities in which tra±c congestion and commuting times vary, we
therefore expect, all else equal, to see lower labor force participation rates in cities with high
commuting times. In our model, we cannot predict with assurance whether the husband
or wife will withdraw from the labor force. But as we have noted, as an empirical matter
it is more likely to be the wife. Also, if the woman has a comparative advantage in such
home-related activities as bearing children or caring for an infant child, this reinforces the
likelihood that the woman stays home in a household that has one earner. The economic
logic is simple: congestion can increase commute times and this increases the value of being
at home relative to the value of working. This e®ect is likely to be especially pronounced
for women with young children. We therefore expect labor supply of these women to be
especially sensitive to changes in commuting time.19
With these ideas in mind, we turn to an empirical investigation of the relationship between
commuting times across U.S. cities and labor supplied.
4. An Empirical Analysis of Labor Supply and Commuting Time
4.1. MSA-Level Labor Force Participation and Commuting Time. To begin the
empirical analysis, average commuting time is computed for each of the 50 MSAs. The Cen-
sus asks respondents about how long it takes them to get to work; this number is multiplied
by two to obtain the daily commute measure. For each MSA, average daily commuting time
is estimated for working married women, women with children, and married men. These
results are summarized in Table 4. Women on average have shorter commute than men,
and women with children commute even less. For men, commuting to work and back takes
on average at least 43.5 minutes a day (in Dayton) and can be as much as 76.1 minutes a
day (in New York). For women, the daily commute varies between 38.6 and 63.4 minutes a
day on average, depending on the MSA. In short, the cross-city di®erences in average daily
commute are substantial. The cities with the longest commute times are New York, Wash-
ington, D.C., and Chicago. Dayton, Oklahoma City, and Bu®alo have the shortest average
commute times in the sample of 50 MSAs.
19In terms of our model, one can think of the value of \leisure" (which includes such non-leisurely activities
as child care) as being highest for women with children. A more formal way to proceed is to allow individuals
to allocate time among work, commuting, leisure, and also home production. Kolesnikova (2007) follows this
route, showing that individuals who have a ¯xed time commitment to home production (e.g., women who
are committed to the care of young children at home) will indeed have labor supply decisions that are more
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Clearly, commuting time is important. A married man in the median MSA works ap-
proximately 9 hours per day, and typical total daily commutes easily tops 1 hour in many
cities.
To examine an e®ect of commute times on the participation decision of women it is nec-
essary to have a measure of the average commuting time cost in an MSA. Because many
women do not work, there is a selection bias in our estimates of their average commute.
Thus, women's average commute time cannot be used as such a measure. On the other
hand, most white married men do work.20 Their average commuting time can serve as an
indicator of the di±culty of the commute in a city.21 In what follows this measure is referred
to as an \MSA daily commute time."
Our theory above gives an unambiguous prediction about the e®ects of commuting time
on labor force participation, so we focus initially on the cross-MSA relationship between
labor force participation by married women and commuting times.
Table 5 reports the results from an MSA-level linear regression in which the dependent
variable is the MSA labor force participation rates, and average MSA daily commute time
(for men) is the key explanatory variable. The analysis is performed separately for high
school educated women and for women with a college degree. Results indicate that higher
levels of the MSA daily commute time are generally associated with lower levels of labor
force participation rates among married women. The association is stronger for women with
a high school level of education. A 1-minute increase in the MSA daily commute time is
associated with a 0:3 percentage point reduction in the labor force participation rate of high
school educated women. We have included some of the other control variables discussed
when we presented Table 3.22 Among these variables, only the unemployment rate of non-
Hispanic white men is found to be statistically signi¯cant at conventional levels. Failure to
include this latter variable makes virtually no di®erence to the estimates of the impact of
commuting time; there is a near zero correlation between MSA daily commute time and the
MSA unemployment rate.23
20Participation of white married men aged 25 to 55 is above 90 percent in every city in our analysis.
21We also used city commute data provided by the Census. The numbers are very close to the estimates
reported in Table 4 and produced similar results in our analysis.
22As with the analysis reported in Table 3, all regressions were also conducted using the ACCRA city
cost of living index instead of the Chen-Rosenthal housing price index. Results were unchanged.
23As we discuss above, we do not have measures of child-care costs, which might also be relevant. Cortes
and Tessada (2007) consider the possibility that in a city with a high concentration of low-skilled immigrants,
who often work as maids and nannies, the cost of day care might be low, which in turn could increase the
labor supply of high-skilled American women. They ¯nd no such e®ects except for an increase in work hours16 DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
4.2. Individual Level Analysis of Labor Force Participation. We next look at in-
dividual level data, examining the relationship between the MSA daily commute time and
women's labor force participation decisions. We estimated both a probit model and a linear
probability model. Marginal e®ects were nearly identical, so we focus on the linear model,
which is easier to interpret. In our analysis the dependent indicator variable, which equals
1 if the woman participates in the labor force, is multiplied by 100 (so that probability can
be discussed in percentage points).
The usual problem when estimating labor supply is that wages are observed only for those
who work. The approach here is to include in each regression only women with exactly
the same level of education, i.e., women who are likely to have similar levels of market
productivity.24 As we discuss above, the relative value of women's time spent at home is
plausibly higher among women with young children than those without children, which in
turn can make these women more sensitive to commute time than other women. To account
for this possibility, the sample is also divided into three separate groups: women with children
younger than 5 years old, women with children none of whom are younger than 5, and women
with no children.
Panel A1 of Table 6 presents the ¯rst piece of individual-level empirical evidence concerning
the e®ect of the MSA daily commute time on workforce participation decisions by married
women. It indicates that an increase in MSA commute time is associated with a decrease in
the probability of being in the labor force for all the groups. The e®ect is the largest for high
school graduates with young children. For them, a 1 minute increase in the MSA commute
time is associated with a decrease in the probability of labor force participation of 0.51
percentage points. For high school educated women with children but no young children,
the associated decrease in probability of labor force participation is 0.31 percentage points,
while for high school educated women with no children the estimated e®ect is 0.14 percentage
points. For women with a college degree the e®ect of longer average commuting time on labor
of women with graduate degrees (a group whom we do not study). Nonetheless, to satisfy curiosity, we did
include their measure of low-skilled immigrants in our city-level regressions (for the 25 cities for which the
Cortes and Tessada measure is available). We similarly ¯nd no evidence that low-skilled immigrants increase
women's labor supply. More importantly, our key results about the e®ect of commuting time were virtually
unchanged.
24While there is substantial debate on the validity of education as an instrument in this context, in fact
education is frequently used as an instrument in estimating labor supply. See, for example, Ham and Reilly
(2002), MaCurdy (1981), Altonji (1986), Ham (1986), and Reilly (1994).WOMEN'S LABOR SUPPLY 17
force participation decisions is somewhat smaller, as one would expect if the opportunity cost
of their time at work is higher than for women with a high school level of education.25
Panel A2 repeats our empirical exercise, but now instruments for location with place of
birth. The concern is that place of residence is a decision variable, and that the results in
Panel A1 might simply re°ect that one-earner households sort to places with long commutes.
We instrument with state of birth, which is arguably exogenous, and this proves to be a
powerful predictor of the city of residence in adulthood. In particular, for each state, we
compute the average daily commute in 2000 of white non-Hispanic married men who are
25-55 years old. We then use average commute time in a state of birth as an instrument
for MSA daily commute time for each observation.26 Our key coe±cients of interest remain
negative and statistically signi¯cant, and if anything are larger in absolute value.
27
In Panels B1 and B2 of Table 6, the model speci¯cation includes other factors that a®ect
labor supply decisions, such as the number of children, husband's education, and controls
for 5-years age intervals. In addition, an MSA unemployment rate for white men is included
to control for local labor market conditions. When these factors are included, the estimated
coe±cients tend to be slightly smaller (in absolute value) than the ones reported for the ¯rst
two panels, but the overall pattern is similar.
28
4.3. Changes in MSA Labor Force Participation, 1980 to 2000. In this section we
return to the MSA-level analysis, but now we examine data from the 1980 and 1990 Census
PUMS. We compute labor force participation rates of white married women in 50 large MSAs
in 1980 and 1990. The average MSA daily commuting time is also calculated using 1980 and
1990 Census PUMS data and is used as an explanatory variable.
29 In analyzing 2000 data,
neither wage nor housing prices seem to matter much for married women's participation at
the MSA level (see Table 5), so we do not include them in our regressions here.
25Johnson (2009) includes the average MSA travel time in his model that estimates e®ect of house price
variation across metro areas on married women's labor supply. He also ¯nds a negative e®ect of longer
commute on labor force participation.
26Notice that the ¯rst-stage F statistics are quite large; we do not have a problem with weak instruments.
27In all analyses standard errors are obtained using a Huber-White sandwich estimator of the variance
using clustering on MSA level.
28We include husband's education as a proxy for husband's permanent income, which is the appropriate
construct a®ecting married women's labor supply, as Mincer (1962) argues. In fact, our empirical exercise is
similar in spirit to Mincer (1962), who also uses cross-city variation to examine female labor supply. His work
does not consider commuting times, and in our work we are not trying to estimate labor supply elasticities.
29Unfortunately, we cannot examine earlier decades because we do not have commuting time data.18 DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
As was the case in 2000, there is a signi¯cant variation across cities in labor force par-
ticipation rates of white married women in 1980 and 1990. For instance, the participation
rates of high school educated women vary from 41 percent in Pittsburgh to 67 percent in
Greensboro in 1980 and from 51 percent in New York City to 78 percent in Minneapolis
in 1990.
30 As in 2000, this variation is \explained" in part by commuting times: Longer
average commute times within an MSA are associated with lower levels of married women's
labor force participation. The results are reported in Table 7.
31
We next ask if changes in commuting time over the decades under study are correlated
with MSA-speci¯c trends in women's labor force participation.
In order to conduct a di®erences-in-di®erences analysis, we ¯rst calculate the di®erences
in female participation rates between the Census dates for each city. When we undertake
this ¯rst step, we ¯nd that the labor force participation rose about 16 percentage points
on average between 1980 and 2000 for high school educated married women and about 14
percentage points for college educated women, with most of the increase occurring between
1980 and 1990. However, the rise in participation is not uniform across MSAs. From 1980
through 2000 high school educated women's employment rose by only 5 percentage points
in San Francisco, while increasing by 24 percentage points in Bu®alo. During the 1990s,
some MSAs experienced moderate increases in participation rates of married women while
in others participation declined (e.g., it fell by 7 percentage points in Honolulu).
Our second step is to look at MSA-speci¯c changes in the average commuting time. We
¯nd that between 1980 and 2000 the daily MSA commute increased by about 5 minutes on
average.
We then examine a relationship between changes in the MSA-level commute time and
changes in women's participation rates over the same period. To control for changes in labor
market demand conditions over the years, changes in unemployment rates of white men
are also included (in speci¯cation (2) for each regression). Results are presented in Table
8. Panel A shows the results of the linear regression estimation for white married women
with a high school diploma. Panel B present the results for women with a college degree.
We ¯nd a negative relationship between the change in commute time in an MSA and the
30The numbers reported here are averages that are standardized using the sample age distribution. They
di®er slightly from the results in Table 1.
31As was true of the 2000 data, including the MSA unemployment rate of white men in the regression
to control for labor demand conditions does not change the e®ect of a longer commute on the employment
rates of white women. Compare columns (1) and (2) for each group in Table 7.WOMEN'S LABOR SUPPLY 19
change in the employment rate of married women in that MSA; cities in which commuting
time increased most rapidly generally also experienced slower growth in female labor force
participation.
We note a ¯nal observation. In results not reported here (but available in an earlier working
paper version of the paper), we investigated the relationship between MSA commute times
and married men's labor supply. We ¯nd that in cities with long commute times, men
actually work slightly longer hours.
32 This is consistent with our model above: Commute
times seem to a®ect the intensive margin in household labor supply, as married women
withdraw from the labor force, but if anything induces marginally more labor supplied from
husbands.
5. Concluding Remarks
Using Census Public Use Micro Sample (PUMS) data for 1940 through 2000, we ¯nd
wide variation in labor market participation rates of white married women in 50 large U.S.
metropolitan areas. This wide variation is found in all years and appears for women with
di®erent levels of education, as well as for women with and without children. Among a
number of explanations for observed cross-city di®erences in female labor supply one emerges
as particularly important: Married women's labor force participation decisions appear to be
related to MSAs' commuting times.
While the possibility that ¯xed employment costs might matter for female labor supply
was raised in the literature many years ago (e.g., Oi, 1976, and Cogan, 1981), we know of no
work that has explored implications for the cross-city variation in labor supply. With this
in mind we have undertaken an analysis that, ¯rst, sets out a simple theory of labor supply.
In our theoretical exploration, we emphasized that an increase in the commuting cost c can
be expected to reduce labor force participation of married women, while at the same time
increasing the number of hours worked by working husbands.
Cross-section evidence is consistent with the theory. We ¯nd a negative association be-
tween commuting time and women's labor force participation rates in the three decades for
which we have commuting time data (1980, 1990, and 2000). Similarly, the negative correla-
tion between commuting times and participation appears also in a di®erences-in-di®erences
32OLS estimates are positive and statistically signi¯cant, but IV estimates are not statistically signi¯cant.20 DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
analysis; metropolitan areas that experienced relatively large increases in average commut-
ing times between 1980 and 2000 experienced slower growth of labor force participation of
married women.
For women, the e®ects of commute times are quite large. From Table 5 we see that a
1-minute increase in an MSA's commute time is associated with an approximately 0.3 per-
centage point decline in the labor force participation of women with a high school education.
33 Table 4 indicates that the di®erence in commute times, from the shortest-commute MSA
to the longest-commute MSA, is 33 minutes. Taking our estimates at face value, this vari-
ation might be expected to lead to a 10 percentage point di®erence in participation across
cities. Commute time di®erences across MSAs thus plausibly \explain" a fair amount of the
cross-MSA variation in participation observed in Table 1.
It might be reasonable to ask, indeed, if our estimates are \too big." One might reason
that a 30-minute increase in commute time presents an opportunity cost of only $10 daily
for a woman who earns $20/hour. Could such a modest factor plausibly have such a large
impact on behavior? In thinking about that issue it is important to recognize that the
cost to a typical mother of living in a high-commute MSA extends far beyond the increased
time she spends commuting if she works. As we noted above, in congested cities there will
be additional time required for travel to the grocery store, piano lessons, or little league
baseball. If she chooses to commute a long distance to work, a mother will likely be farther
from her children's school, which can make life di±cult when she needs to be available for a
parent-teacher conference or a class play. Our estimates are not picking up the pure e®ect
of the commute time of the participation decision, but the total impact of congestion on the
participation decision.
One implication of our work concerns the century-long increase in the female labor force
participation|the increase in married women's participation from only about 7 percent in
1900 to current rates (near 70 percent). There are doubtless many factors contributing to
this trend, many of which have received careful examination in the literature. Little attention
has been given, though, to the possibility that part of this trend is due to the reduction in
commuting costs, owing to improvements in transportation technology|the expansion of
modern public transportation, the introduction and continued improvement in automotive
technology, improvements in roads, and so on|and changes in residential patterns.
33We draw a similar inference for the modal group of women, women with older children at home, in the
individual-level analysis in Table 6. (See the middle columns in Panel B2.)WOMEN'S LABOR SUPPLY 21
Our ¯ndings about the wide cross-city variation in the labor force participation of mar-
ried women also introduce a new dimension to the current discussion about trends in the
female labor supply. In particular, these ¯ndings complicate discussions about women hav-
ing reached a \natural rate" of labor force participation. The issue is how close to 1 we
can expect this participation rate to be. Goldin (2006), Juhn and Potter (2006), and others
show that labor force participation rates depend on a combination of demographic factors
such as age, presence of children, education, and race. The \natural rate" of participation
is expected to be di®erent for di®erent groups. Our research suggests that the maximum
achievable rate of labor force participation for each group would also vary across cities (and
also across countries) because of di®erences in commuting time.
Of course, commuting times in local communities also depend on population density,
the resources devoted to transportation, and local planning (e.g., zoning laws that may
sometimes serve to isolate residential communities from job locations). Thus, from a public
policy perspective, it may be that targeted actions that reduce commuting times would
thereby increase labor force participation by women.34
Yet another open policy issue concerns the importance of variation in labor supply across
cities for tax and welfare policy. It would be interesting to analyze how di®erences in the
time cost of commuting a®ect labor supply responses to changes in such policies.
Finally, we note that most empirical research in labor economics is conducted at the
national level, with little attention given to the possibility that local labor markets di®er in
important ways. Our research points to the value of work that allows for the possibility of
di®erences across locations in labor supply responses. More generally, there is surely a rich
set of interesting issues yet to be examined around the interactions of urban characteristics
and labor market outcomes.
34In this sense, the work here is related to the \spatial mismatch hypothesis" literature that typically
looks at job accessibility as a determinant of the generally poor employment prospects of minority workers.
This idea was ¯rst introduced by Kain (1968).22 DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
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Figure 1. Labor Force Participation Trends of Non-Hispanic White Married
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Figure 4. E®ect of an Increase in Commuting Time c on Consumption and
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Table 1. Labor Force Participation Rates of Non-Hispanic White Married
Women with a High School Degree, Census PUMS
MSA Census Year
2000 1990 1980 1970 1950 1940
United States 0.69 0.65 0.53 0.41 0.27 0.16
New York 0.52 0.52 0.47 0.36 0.23 0.16
Honolulu 0.55 0.62 0.46 0.34 | |
Los Angeles 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.41 0.31 0.21
Miami 0.61 0.65 0.55 0.45 0.29 0.23
Houston 0.61 0.63 0.56 0.37 0.34 0.16
San Francisco 0.62 0.66 0.57 0.42 0.34 0.20
San Diego 0.62 0.62 0.51 0.39 0.29 0.14
San Antonio 0.63 0.60 0.53 0.37 0.37 0.18
Detroit 0.63 0.59 0.45 0.31 0.26 0.17
New Orleans 0.64 0.62 0.44 0.36 0.15 0.20
Sacramento 0.64 0.64 0.54 0.41 0.50 0.20
Birmingham 0.65 0.63 0.53 0.43 0.29 0.16
Pittsburgh 0.65 0.58 0.41 0.30 0.14 0.08
West Palm Beach 0.65 0.65 0.53 0.40 | |
Portland 0.66 0.66 0.54 0.41 0.31 0.20
Norfolk 0.67 0.61 | 0.40 0.16 0.11
Oklahoma City 0.67 0.68 0.57 0.49 0.51 0.26
Chicago 0.67 0.64 0.53 0.40 0.28 0.17
Las Vegas 0.68 0.63 0.56 0.45 | |
Phoenix 0.68 0.64 0.54 0.49 0.22 0.20
Seattle 0.68 0.67 0.55 0.41 0.25 0.16
Atlanta 0.68 0.69 0.59 0.44 0.34 0.26
Dallas-Fort Worth 0.69 0.69 0.60 0.50 0.35 0.24
Memphis 0.69 0.66 0.55 0.41 0.40 0.18
Philadelphia 0.69 0.64 0.49 0.35 0.23 0.15
Austin 0.69 0.71 0.65 0.47 0.37 0.23
Orlando 0.69 0.69 0.56 0.38 0.35 |
Tampa 0.69 0.69 0.53 0.43 0.26 0.22
Dayton 0.69 0.66 0.51 0.42 0.41 0.19
Cleveland 0.69 0.65 0.49 0.36 0.25 0.17
Charlotte 0.70 0.73 0.65 0.54 0.25 0.29
Nashville 0.70 0.71 0.60 0.44 0.34 0.34
Salt Lake City 0.70 0.67 0.53 0.44 0.22 0.12
Boston 0.71 0.65 0.54 0.40 0.24 0.11
Bu®alo 0.71 0.65 0.47 0.37 0.23 0.12
Baltimore 0.72 0.69 0.54 0.41 0.29 0.18
Indianapolis 0.72 0.70 0.57 0.46 0.30 0.22
St. Louis 0.72 0.67 0.53 0.38 0.25 0.17
Cincinnati 0.72 0.68 0.52 0.35 0.21 0.11
Louisville 0.73 0.68 0.54 0.40 0.31 0.19
Washington 0.73 0.72 0.58 0.45 0.35 0.26
Richmond 0.73 0.73 0.60 0.39 0.35 0.25
Kansas City 0.74 0.69 0.57 0.49 0.31 0.23
Denver 0.74 0.72 0.58 0.47 0.38 0.14
Albany 0.74 0.70 0.56 0.43 0.29 0.15
Columbus 0.74 0.70 0.57 0.39 0.40 0.20
Rochester 0.75 0.68 0.54 0.43 0.31 0.23
Greensboro 0.77 0.76 0.68 0.59 0.37 0.30
Milwaukee 0.78 0.74 0.60 0.46 0.33 0.17
Minneapolis 0.79 0.78 0.64 0.44 0.29 0.1530 DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
Table 2. Summary of Married Women's Labor Force Participation by Edu-
cation and Presence of Children in 50 Large MSAs
With Children With Children, No Children
Under 5 None Under 5
High School College High School College High School College
lowest MSA 0.29 0.41 0.56 0.65 0.54 0.78
10th percentile 0.44 0.54 0.65 0.7 0.65 0.82
25th percentile 0.48 0.56 0.67 0.72 0.69 0.84
median MSA 0.53 0.6 0.72 0.74 0.73 0.86
75th percentile 0.59 0.65 0.74 0.78 0.75 0.88
90th percentile 0.62 0.67 0.77 0.79 0.78 0.89
highest MSA 0.68 0.71 0.83 0.86 0.82 0.93
Note: Data are from the 2000 Census PUMS. The sample consists of non-Hispanic white married
women aged 25 to 55 years with non-imputed data. The unit of observation is the MSA. There
are 50 MSAs. The MSA-speci¯c averages are standardized using the sample age distribution.
Table 3. MSA-Level Regression: Labor Force Participation of Married Women
N=50 High School Bachelor's Degree
Quality Adjusted ¡4:90 ¡4:09
Housing Index £106 (3:75) (2:77)
Single Women ¡0:002 ¡0:001
Wage (0:003) (0:002)




Signi¯cance Levels, One-Tailed Tests: *5%, **1%
Note: Data are from 2000 Census PUMS. The unit of obser-
vation is an MSA. Standard errors are in parentheses.WOMEN'S LABOR SUPPLY 31
Table 4. Summary of Daily Commuting Time in 50 Large MSAs
Married Married Married Women
Men Women with Children
lowest MSA 43.5 38.6 37.4
10th percentile 47.0 41.1 40.5
25th percentile 50.4 44.0 43.0
median MSA 54.3 47.4 46.5
75th percentile 58.1 50.6 49.2
90th percentile 63.1 53.4 51.8
highest MSA 76.1 63.4 61.2
Note: Data are from the 2000 Census PUMS. The sample
consists of non-Hispanic white married men and women aged
25 to 55 years with non-imputed data. The unit of obser-
vation is the MSA. There are 50 MSAs. The MSA-speci¯c
averages are standardized by age and education.
Table 5. MSA-Level Regression: Labor Force Participation of Married
Women (with Commute Time as an Explanatory Variable)
N=50 High School Bachelor's Degree
Quality Adjusted ¡1:56 ¡3:08
Housing Index £106 (3:58) (2:79)
Single Women 0:12 0:10
Wage (0:29) (0:22)
Unemployment Rate ¡3:52** ¡0:55
(0:94) (0:76)
MSA Average Daily ¡0:33** ¡0:15*
Commute £10¡2 (0:10) (0:10)
R2 0:440 0:171
N 50 50
Signi¯cance Levels, One-tailed Test: *5%, **1%
Note: Data are from 2000 Census PUMS. The unit of obser-
vation is an MSA. Standard errors are in parentheses.32 DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
Table 6. Individual-Level Regression: Labor Force Participation of Married
Women, by Presence of Children and Woman's Education
With Children With Children, No Children
Under 5 None Under 5
H. School College H. School College H. School College
Panel A1. Labor Force Participation, OLS Regression
MSA Commute ¡0:51¤¤ ¡0:36¤¤ ¡0:31¤¤ ¡0:20¤¤ ¡0:14y ¡0:05
(0.228) (0.078) (0.114) (0.075) (0.105) (0.057)
R2 0.0063 0.0031 0.0025 0.0011 0.0005 0.0001
Panel A2. Labor Force Participation, IV Regression
MSA Commute ¡0:78¤¤ ¡0:61¤¤ ¡0:62¤¤ ¡0:40¤ ¡0:30y ¡0:19y
(0.319) (0.241) (0.214) (0.234) (0.213) (0.135)
R2 0.0046 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
F (¯rst stage) 13.8 18.9 13.3 17.1 13.9 14.1
Panel B1. Labor Force Participation, using Husband's Education, OLS Regression
MSA Commute ¡0:44¤¤ ¡0:32¤¤ ¡0:25¤¤ ¡0:13¤ ¡0:14y ¡0:03
(0.148) (0.083) (0.084) (0.074) (0.098) (0.055)
Number of Children ¡7:11¤¤ ¡10:37¤¤ ¡4:21¤¤ ¡5:74¤¤
(0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.3)
MSA Unemp. Rate ¡4:45¤¤ ¡0:72 ¡3:63¤¤ ¡1:53¤ ¡2:18¤¤ ¡1:08¤¤
(1.42) (0.82) (0.75) (0.63) (0.82) (0.41)
Controls
Woman's Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Husband's Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0376 0.0735 0.0174 0.0474 0.0226 0.0541
Panel B2. Labor Force Participation, using Husband's Education, IV Regression
MSA Commute ¡0:64¤¤ ¡0:69¤¤ ¡0:44¤¤ ¡0:38¤ ¡0:24 ¡0:17y
(0.249) (0.237) (0.184) (0.225) (0.204) (0.114)
Number of Children ¡7:10¤¤ ¡10:48¤¤ ¡4:15¤¤ ¡5:73¤¤
(0.4) (0.5) (0.3) (0.3)
MSA Unemp. Rate ¡4:17¤¤ ¡0:41 ¡3:50¤¤ ¡1:41y ¡2:12¤¤ ¡0:97¤
(1.47) (1.31) (0.90) (0.94) (0.82) (0.55)
Controls
Woman's Age Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Husband's Education Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.0367 0.0702 0.0165 0.0456 0.0224 0.0531
F (¯rst stage) 19.8 22.7 18.2 19.9 16.3 17.0
N 13,483 26,654 41,889 32,007 22,770 27,507
Signi¯cance Levels, One-Tailed Test: y10%, ¤5%, ¤¤1%.
Note: Standard errors are clustered at MSA level. Data are from the 2000 Census PUMS. The
dependent variable is a labor force participation dummy multiplied by 100 (so interpretation is
in percentage points). The sample, drawn from the 2000 PUMS, consists of non-Hispanic white
married women aged 25 to 55 years with non-imputed data, living in the 50 largest MSAs. The
MSA unemployment rate is for white men and is measured in percentage points. Controls for
the woman's age are a set of dummy variables for each of the 5-year intervals between 25 and 55
years old. Controls for a husband's education are a set of dummy variables for each education
category (less than high school, high school diploma, etc.).WOMEN'S LABOR SUPPLY 33
Table 7. MSA-Level Regressions: Labor Force Participation of Married
Women, 1990 and 1980
High School Educated College Educated
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Panel A. MSA Labor Force Participation Rates in 1990
MSA Commute ¡0:314¤¤ ¡0:279¤¤ ¡0:112¤ ¡0:110¤
(0.097) (0.086) (0.056) (0.060)
MSA Unemployment ¡2:64¤¤ ¡0:15
(0.674) (0.449)
Intercept 82:38¤¤ 88:46¤¤ 79:14¤¤ 79:49¤¤
(4.93) (4.60) (2.86) (3.06)
R2 0:180 0:382 0:076 0:079
N 50 50 50 50
Panel B. MSA Labor Force Participation Rates in 1980
High School Educated College Educated
(1) (2) (1) (2)
MSA Commute ¡0:231¤¤ ¡0:226¤¤ ¡0:011 ¡0:010
(0.104) (0.085) (0.082) (0.082)
MSA Unemployment ¡27:3¤¤ ¡0:639
(0.561) (0.540)
Intercept 66:04¤¤ 73:57¤¤ 58:61¤¤ 60:37¤¤
(5.21) (4.56) (4.15) (4.39)
R2 0:096 0:403 0:001 0:030
N 49 49 49 49
Signi¯cance levels: ¤ 5% , ¤¤ 1%.
Note: Data are from 1990 and 1980 Census PUMS. Norfolk is not
identi¯ed in 1980 Census data. Standard errors are in parentheses.
The dependent variable is MSA-speci¯c labor force participation of
non-Hispanic white married women. Unemployment rate is for white
men. Both unemployment and labor force participation are measured
in percentage points.34 DAN A. BLACK, NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA, AND LOWELL J. TAYLOR
Table 8. Di®erences-in-Di®erences Estimation
Panel A. ¢ Labor Force Participation, High School Graduates
1980-2000 1980-1990 1990-2000
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
¢ Commute ¡0:51¤¤ ¡0:31¤ ¡0:28¤ ¡0:25y ¡0:62¤¤ ¡0:65¤¤
(0.188) (0.171) (0.167) (0.158) (0.196) (0.177)
¢ Unemp. Rate ¡2:61¤¤ ¡1:11¤ ¡1:69¤¤
(0.649) (0.425) (0.484)
R2 0:135 0:360 0:058 0:180 0:171 0:342
N 49 49 49 49 50 50
Panel B. ¢ Labor Force Participation, College Graduates
1980-2000 1980-1990 1990-2000
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
¢ Commute ¡0:63¤¤ ¡0:48¤¤ ¡0:12 ¡0:08 ¡0:33 ¡0:37y
(0.139) (0.128) (0.177) (0.167) (0.224) (0.201)
¢ Unemp. Rate ¡1:91¤¤ ¡1:20¤¤ ¡1:94¤¤
(0.485) (0.448) (0.552)
R2 0:299 0:475 0:010 0:142 0:043 0:242
N 49 49 49 49 50 50
Signi¯cance levels: y10%, ¤5%, ¤¤1%.
Note: Data are from 1980, 1990, and 2000 Census PUMS. The unit of observation
is an MSA. Norfolk is not identi¯ed in 1980 Census data. In each of the regres-
sions, the dependent variable is change of LFP rates of non-Hispanic white married
women in each MSA in the indicated time period, measured in percentage points.
The independent variable is the change in average MSA daily commuting time of
non-Hispanic white married men over the same period. Standard errors are in
parentheses.